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Note
AMERICAN LEGION V. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASS’N:
EXEMPTING LONGSTANDING GOVERNMENTAL RELIGIOUS
DISPLAYS FROM ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SCRUTINY AND
HOW THE ENDORSEMENT TEST COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT
M. ALLISON HYDE*
In American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n 1 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether a large monument in the shape of a Latin
cross on government land (“the Cross”) and maintained by the government
violated the Establishment Clause. The Court’s decision turned on whether
commemorating World War I (“WWI”) veterans was a purpose sufficiently
secular to overcome the cross’s Christian association. Part I of this Note will
discuss the history of the Cross and the lower courts’ litigation of the
challenge to government ownership. Part II will discuss the enactment of the
Establishment Clause and Supreme Court case law on governmental displays
of religious expression leading up to American Legion. Part III will discuss
the decision in American Legion, which held that longstanding religious
monuments are presumptively constitutional and the Cross is constitutional
as a longstanding symbol possessing a legitimate secular meaning. 2 In Part
IV, this Note will argue that although the Court’s holding was consistent with
relevant precedent, 3 its opinion unnecessarily created an exemption from
Establishment Clause scrutiny for longstanding governmental religious
displays. 4 Instead, the Court should have invoked its endorsement test as the
most appropriate existing test for evaluating religious displays. 5 Finally, this
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1. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
2. Id. at 2089–90.
3. See infra Section IV.A.
4. See infra Section IV.B.
5. See infra Section IV.C.
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Note will argue that a modified version of the endorsement test should be
adopted for analyzing such displays in the future. 6
I. THE CASE
In 1918, a group of Prince George’s County residents formed a
committee to construct a memorial for the county’s fallen WWI soldiers. 7
The committee decided the memorial would be a cross and would stand at
the end of the National Defense Highway (another WWI memorial) 8 in the
median of a three-way intersection owned by the Town of Bladensburg,
Maryland. 9 The committee sought donations with a form reading:
We, the citizens of Maryland, trusting in God, the Supreme Ruler
of the Universe, Pledge Faith in our Brothers who gave their all in
the World War to make [the] World Safe for Democracy. Their
Mortal Bodies have turned to dust, but their spirit Lives to guide
us through Life in the way of Godliness, Justice and Liberty.
With our Motto, “One God, One Country, and One Flag” We
contribute to this Memorial Cross Commemorating the Memory of
those who have not Died in Vain. 10
The local post of the American Legion took over the project in 1922 and
completed construction of the monument in 1925. 11 At its dedication
ceremony, a Catholic priest offered the invocation and a Baptist pastor
offered the benediction. 12 The keynote speaker, United States Representative
Stephen W. Gambrill, called the Cross “symbolic of Calvary,” 13 and reporters
described it as “[a] mammoth cross, a likeness of the Cross of the Calvary,
as described in the Bible,” “a monster [C]alvary cross,” and a “huge sacrifice
cross.” 14 The Cross is approximately forty feet tall and an American flag
6. See infra Section IV.D.
7. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2076. Among this group were the mothers of ten deceased WWI
soldiers. Id.
8. Id. at 2077.
9. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019); Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373, 377
(D. Md. 2015), rev’d, 874 F.3d 195 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
10. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2076–77 (alteration in original). Another fundraising flyer read:
[T]hose who come to the Nation’s Capital to view the wonders of its architecture and the
sacred places where their laws are made and administered may, before this Cross,
rededicate[] themselves to the principles of their fathers and renew the fires of patriotism
and loyalty to the nation which prompted these young men to rally to the defense of the
right. And here the friends and loved ones of those who were in the great conflict will
pass daily over a highway memorializing their boys who made the supreme sacrifice.
Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 377 (second alteration in original).
11. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 377–78.
12. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2077.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2109 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alterations in original).

838

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:836

currently flies at its side. 15 It has the American Legion’s emblem at its center
on both sides, and bears a plaque at its base that reads “Dedicated to the
heroes of Prince George’s County, Maryland who lost their lives in the Great
War for the liberty of the world,” and lists the names of forty-nine fallen
county soldiers. 16
Since its dedication, the site of the Cross has been used for events
honoring members of the military, such as Veterans Day, Memorial Day, and
Independence Day, 17 which have often included prayer. 18 The Cross has also
been the site of three documented Sunday worship services, all occurring in
August 1931. 19 Monuments honoring veterans of other conflicts have been
added as part of what has become known as Veterans Memorial Park. 20 The
nearest of these monuments is 200 feet from the Cross and no other
monument is as tall as the Cross. 21 There are no other religious symbols in
the park. 22
In 1961, the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission
(“Commission”) acquired the Cross and accompanying land “in order to
preserve the monument and address traffic-safety concerns.” 23 The
American Legion reserved the right to use the site for ceremonies.24 By 2014,
the Commission had spent $117,000 in public funds to maintain the Cross
and land and had set aside an additional $100,000 for renovations. 25 In 1985,

15. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
16. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2077 (majority opinion). The Fourth Circuit noted “bushes have
historically obscured” the part of the Cross containing the plaque, and “the plaque is badly
weathered, rendering it largely illegible to passing motorists.” Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at
201. The words “valor,” “endurance,” “courage,” and “devotion” are also inscribed on the bases.
Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 376.
17. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 379.
18. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 201.
19. Id. at 217 (Gregory, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Fourth Circuit
noted: “Nothing in the record indicates that any of these services represented any faith other than
Christianity.” Id. at 201 (majority opinion).
20. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2077.
21. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 202. No other monuments are taller than ten feet. Id.
22. Id.
23. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078. In 1935, the Maryland state legislature directed the State
Roads Commission to investigate ownership of the land out of traffic safety concerns and to acquire
it by purchase or condemnation. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 378. The record is unclear
as to when and what land was transferred, but, to resolve any ambiguities, the American Legion
local post “transfer[ed] and assign[ed] to [the Commission] all of its right, title and interest in and
to the Peace Cross . . . and the tract upon which it is located.” Id. (alterations in original).
24. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2078.
25. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 201.
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the Cross was rededicated to honor “‘the sacrifices made [in] all wars,’ . . .
by ‘all veterans.’” 26
In 2014, the American Humanist Association (“AHA”) 27 and three nonChristian residents 28 of Washington, D.C. and Maryland 29 brought an action
under Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code in federal district court
against the Commission claiming the Cross’s location on publicly owned
land and its maintenance by a public agency violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 30 Plaintiffs sought relocation, demolition,
or at least the removal of the Cross’s arms. 31 The American Legion chose to
intervene as a defendant.32 The United States District Court for the District
of Maryland granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that
under either of the Supreme Court’s two approaches for deciding
Establishment Clause cases—the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman 33
(“Lemon test”) and the approach applied in Van Orden v. Perry 34—the Cross
was constitutional. 35 Finding disagreement among the courts (within the
Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court jurisprudence), the district court found
it unnecessary to determine which test to use, since “[b]oth tests ‘require the
[c]ourt to inquire into the nature, context, and history’ of the Monument and
lead to the same result” of finding the Cross constitutional. 36 Applying the
Lemon test, the court reasoned the government’s purpose for ownership and
maintenance of the Cross and surrounding property was predominantly

26. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2104 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
27. “[AHA] is a nonprofit organization that advocates to uphold the founding principle of
separation of church and state.” Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 202.
28. Id.
29. Complaint at 2–4, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373
(D. Md. 2015) (No. cv-14-550).
30. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. at 380.
31. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 202, n.7.
32. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 380.
33. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). “Per Lemon, to comply with the Establishment Clause, a challenged
government display must (1) have a secular purpose; (2) not have a ‘principal or primary effect’
that advances, inhibits, or endorses religion; and (3) not foster ‘an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.’” Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 204 (quoting Lambeth v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 269–73 (4th Cir. 2005)). “If a state action violates even
one of these three prongs, that state action is unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Koenick v. Felton, 190
F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 1999)).
34. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). The test from the narrowest grounds opinion in Van Orden involves
analyzing “the circumstances surrounding the monument’s placement, its physical setting, and the
length of time it remains unchallenged.” Am. Humanist Ass’n, 874 F.3d at 205 (quoting Van Orden,
545 U.S. at 698, 700–03 (Breyer, J., concurring)).
35. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 389.
36. Id. at 382 (second alteration in original) (quoting Hewett v. City of King, 29 F. Supp. 3d
585, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2014)).
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secular rather than religious. 37 The court held, under the second prong of the
Lemon test, the primary effect of the Cross on a reasonable observer was not
to imply government endorsement of religion, but to commemorate
veterans. 38 Under the final prong, the court held the Cross had not created an
“‘excessive entanglement’ between government and religion.” 39 In applying
the approach used from Van Orden, the court held that the context and history
of the Cross evinced a more secular than religious purpose and effect. 40
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, holding the Cross violated the Establishment Clause 41 and
remanded the case for determination of a proper remedy. 42 The Fourth
Circuit analyzed the Cross under the Lemon test, “with due consideration
given to the Van Orden factors.” 43 In applying the Lemon test, the Fourth
Circuit also found the Commission had legitimate secular purposes for
37. Id. at 384–85. The court found the Commission’s purpose in obtaining the Cross was based
on traffic safety concerns and the government’s responsibility to maintain highway medians, as well
as preserving and maintaining a “‘historically significant war memorial’ that has honored fallen
soldiers for almost a century.” Id. (quoting Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1099, 1108 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
38. Id. at 386–87. The court considered that the Cross is adorned with secular elements such
as the American Legion’s emblem, the plaque, and four non-religious words at the base; its
longstanding, express function as a war memorial; its placement amidst other secular war
memorials; the predominant use of the site for commemorative, non-religious events celebrating
Memorial Day and Veterans Day; and a cross’s mental evocation of the rows of small crosses
marking the graves of fallen American servicemen overseas, and particularly in the case of the
Cross, which lists the names of forty-nine fallen World War I soldiers. Id.
39. Id. at 387 (quoting Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 272–73
(4th Cir. 2005)). The court found the Cross did not have “the effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion” by much the same analysis it performed for the second prong of the Lemon test, reasoning
that the Cross and the adjoining park are “secular war memorials that host numerous
commemorative events,” and that the government’s maintenance of the land is “for traffic safety
and commemorative purposes.” Id. at 387–88.
40. Id. at 388–89. The court focused on the commemorative purpose of the Cross’s
construction, the Cross’s secular adornments, its location amidst other secular war memorials, its
use for secular events commemorating veterans, and the fact that the Cross had “gone unchallenged
for decades.” Id.
41. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 212 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). The Commission and the American Legion also argued AHA and the
individual plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not “forgone any legal rights.” Id. at 203.
The Fourth Circuit held AHA and the individuals did have standing, reasoning that “[a]n
establishment clause claim is justiciable even when plaintiffs claim noneconomic or intangible
injury,” and “in religious display cases, ‘unwelcome direct contact with a religious display that
appears to be endorsed by the state’ is a sufficient injury to satisfy the standing inquiry.” Id. (quoting
Suhre v. Haywood City, 131 F.3d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1997)).
42. Id. at 212, n.19.
43. Id. at 205. The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the District Court’s doubt of Lemon’s
applicability, saying that Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van Orden is controlling as the narrowest
ground upholding the majority, which clarifies that the Lemon test is still a “useful guidepost” in
Establishment Clause cases analyzing “monuments with both secular and sectarian meanings.” Id.
(quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
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ownership and maintenance of the land, such as maintaining traffic safety
and preserving a WWI memorial. 44 However, the court held the Cross
violated the second prong of the test, because its irredeemably Christian
association and physical prominence implied government endorsement of
Christianity. 45 The court also found a violation of the Lemon test’s third
prong, excessive entanglement between government and religion, based on
the government’s greater than de minimis spending on maintenance of the
Cross. 46 The court made brief reference to Van Orden, noting only that “the
Van Orden factors are unsupportive of Appellees’ position in this case.” 47
Chief Judge Gregory dissented in part, asserting the majority erred by placing
too much emphasis on the Cross’s size to conclude its prominence
overshadowed its secular elements. 48 The Chief Judge opined that such
elements could not be obscured for a reasonable observer, because a
reasonable observer is “deemed aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious display appears.” 49 He would
have held that, given the “overwhelmingly secular history and context” of the
Cross, it did not violate the Establishment Clause.50
The Fourth Circuit then denied Appellees’ request for rehearing en
banc. 51 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
Cross’s location on government property and its maintenance using
government funds violated the Establishment Clause.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For much of the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has struggled with
the preliminary issue of whether to apply the Lemon test. 52 The Court’s
selective use of the test when analyzing governmental religious displays 53 in
particular reveals a pattern: When the Court applied the Lemon test, it held
the display unconstitutional, but when the Court ignored the test, it embraced

44. Id. at 206.
45. Id. at 207–10.
46. Id. at 211.
47. Id. at 212.
48. Id. at 220 (Gregory, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. Id. (quoting Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779–80 (1995)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 117. The order denying the request opined that holding the Latin cross could lose its
predominantly sectarian meaning through the adornment of secular elements, as the Commission
posited, would “amount to the state degradation of religion that the Framers feared and sought to
proscribe.” Id. at 120.
52. See infra Section II.C.
53. In this Note, the phrase “religious displays” refers to both tangible monuments of religion,
such as statues or paintings, and overt expressions of religion, such as a prayer practice.

842

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:836

a more contextual approach that deferred to history to ultimately uphold the
display.
This Part discusses cases where the government itself is communicating
(intentionally or effectively) a potentially religious message, either by a
physical object or verbal speech. 54 Section II.A. discusses the early
American history that motivated the drafting of the Establishment Clause, its
enactment, and its eventual application to States. Section II.B. discusses the
earliest challenges to governmental religious displays decided by the
Supreme Court and concludes with a review of Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971.
Section II.C. details the Supreme Court’s largely consistent application of the
Lemon test to religious displays for the subsequent two decades. Section II.D
discusses the Court’s analysis of religious display cases thereafter, where it
largely shifted away from application of Lemon and toward other analytical
approaches. This Section concludes with the Court’s most recent religious
display decisions preceding American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n.
A. Enactment of the Establishment Clause
The First Amendment begins: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 55
These two clauses are known as the “Religion Clauses”; the first is the
“Establishment Clause,” and the second is the “Free Exercise Clause.”
Though the Court has long recognized the ambiguous nature of each clause
on its own, 56 it has distinguished their prohibitions based on the element of
government coercion: The Free Exercise Clause “depend[s] upon [a]
showing of direct governmental compulsion,” while the Establishment
Clause does not, and “is violated by the enactment of laws which establish
an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.” 57
The Establishment Clause was enacted in response to the “bondage of
laws which compelled [citizens] to support and attend government-favored
churches,” from which many early settlers had sought to escape in Europe.58
That same practice had been transplanted to the new country by colonial
54. With the exception of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), this Note will not detail
the myriad challenges to material assistance provided by the government to religious institutions,
such as subsidies or tax exemptions, or special protections and accommodations conferred to
religious groups.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970) (“The Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The
sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the
purpose was to state an objective not to write a statute.”).
57. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
58. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
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charters “granted by the English Crown to . . . erect religious establishments
which all, whether believers or non-believers, would be required to support
and attend.” 59 At the time of the Revolutionary War, the Church of England
was the established church in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia, and possibly 60 New York and New Jersey. 61 The
Congregationalist Church was the established religion in Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Connecticut. 62 The result was a society filled with
“hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who held contrary beliefs” 63:
Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of
their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail;
Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant Protestant
sects; men and women of varied faiths who happened to be in a
minority in a particular locality were persecuted because they
steadfastly persisted in worshipping God only as their own
consciences dictated. And all of these dissenters were compelled
to pay tithes and taxes to support government-sponsored churches
whose ministers preached inflammatory sermons designed to
strengthen and consolidate the established faith by generating a
burning hated against dissenters. 64
The colony of Virginia took the lead in defining the separation of church
and state. 65 In 1776 the Virginia Convention adopted a Declaration of Rights,
which included the article considered the precursor to the Religion Clauses. 66
It read, in part, “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion.” 67
James Madison wrote his Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious
Assessments, arguing that religion and law should be separate, since actual
religion need not rely on governmental support, and men’s minds should be

59. Id. at 8, 9 n.6 (citing various state charters and the express permission granted to establish
churches). Laws requiring support of the established religion involved taxes and tithes to the church
and prohibitions on the expression of disbelief in the views of ministers or the religious doctrines
themselves. Id. at 9.
60. Engel, 370 U.S. at 428–29, 428 n.10 (“There seems to be some controversy as to whether
[the Church of England] was officially established in New York and New Jersey but there is no
doubt that it received substantial support from those States.” (citing SANFORD H. COBB, THE RISE
OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA 338, 408 (1902))).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 431.
64. Everson, 330 U.S at 10 (footnotes omitted).
65. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787 n.5 (1983); Everson, 370 U.S. at 11.
66. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787 n.5 (citing 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 231–36 (1971); S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA
491–92 (1970)).
67. VA CONST. art. I, § 16 .
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free to decide upon their own beliefs. 68 Madison asserted that state
establishment of Christianity over the previous fifteen centuries had led to
“[m]ore or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
servility in the laity; in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution.” 69 He
argued that teachers of every Christian sect would agree the religion
“appeared in its greatest lustre” in “the ages prior to its incorporation with
Civil policy.” 70
Also in 1786, Virginia enacted the “Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty,”
written by Thomas Jefferson, 71 as well as a statute reading: “That no man
shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his
religious opinions or belief . . . .” 72 Other states were also passing religious
freedom legislation (albeit less drastic).73 Three years later the First Congress
agreed on the final language of the Bill of Rights. 74
Once the federal government was prohibited from passing laws that
established religion, most states enacted similar protections in their
constitutions. 75 Other states, however, maintained religion-focused laws for
nearly fifty years afterward. 76 In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 77 the
Court officially made such state action impermissible by holding the
Establishment Clause was incorporated against the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 78

68. Everson, 370 U.S. at 12 (citing 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, COMPRISING HIS
PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING NUMEROUS LETTERS AND
DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED 183 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)).
69. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 n.14 (1962) (quoting THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON, COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING
NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLISHED 183, 187 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1906)).
70. Id.
71. Everson, 370 U.S. at 12.
72. Id. at 13 (citing 12 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATES AT LARGE: BEING A
COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
THE YEAR 1619, at 84 (1823); H. COMMAGER, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123 (3d ed.
1944)).
73. Engel, 370 U.S. at 428–29 (citing S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA
482–509 (1902)).
74. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 788 (1983) (citing S. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess.,
10, 88 (1820); H.R. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess., 26, 121 (1826)).
75. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13–14.
76. Id. at 14. For instance, “Maryland permitted taxation for support of the Christian religion
and limited civil office to Christians until 1818.” Id. at 14 n.17.
77. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
78. Id. at 303.
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B. Early Religious Display Cases Laid the Foundation for the Lemon
Test
The Supreme Court’s first religious display case after Cantwell was a
challenge to New York public schools’ practice of daily prayer in Engel v.
Vitale. 79 The Court invalidated the practice as a clear instance of establishing
religion. 80 Challenges to prayer in public schools would prove to be far more
straightforward than almost all other display challenges the Court would face.
A clear precursor to the Lemon test came the following year in School
District of Abington v. Schempp, 81 where the Court evaluated state actions
requiring daily Bible readings in public schools. 82 The Court drew on its
analysis in previous Establishment Clause cases to lay out a test for analyzing
challenged laws or practices: “[T]here must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 83 The Court
held the Bible readings unconstitutional since they lacked a secular
purpose. 84
Eight years later in Lemon v. Kurtzman 85 the Court formalized the test
referenced in Schempp. The case involved consolidated challenges to Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes providing supplemental pay to teachers of
secular subjects in nonpublic elementary schools 86 and reimbursement to
nonpublic schools for teachers’ salaries, instructional materials, and secular
textbooks. 87 The majority of beneficiary schools under both statutes were
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church. 88 The Court acknowledged its
use of three main inquiries in Establishment Clause cases, all of which must
be satisfied for the challenged action to survive: “First, the statute must have
a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’” 89
The Court invalidated both statutes, finding each gave rise to an
excessive entanglement between government and religion. 90 The Court
explained that ensuring teachers were not imposing religious teachings in
79. 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
80. Id. at 430.
81. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
82. Id. at 205.
83. Id. at 222 (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961)).
84. Id. at 223–24.
85. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
86. Id. at 607.
87. Id. at 609.
88. Id. at 608, 610.
89. Id. at 612–13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
90. Id. at 613–14.
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secular subjects would require “comprehensive, discriminating, and
continuing state surveillance.” 91 It also found Pennsylvania’s provision of
financial aid directly to religious schools “would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement and . . . could encompass sustained and detailed
administrative relationships.” 92 Finally, the Court reasoned the likelihood
that sectarian schools would continue to grow and require increasingly larger
grants meant the future of the required surveillance would be indefinite, and
the program would cause political divisiveness since the grants would benefit
few religious groups. 93 The Lemon test would be adopted in most cases in
the following years, but disagreement within the Court would ensue early on
as to when and how rigidly to apply the test.
C. The Two-Decade Aftermath of Lemon: The Court Consistently
Applied the Test and Invalidated Religious Displays, Except in
Challenges to Time-Honored Practices
The Court consistently applied the Lemon test to Establishment Clause
challenges generally and religious display cases specifically (with two
notable exceptions 94) over the next two decades.95 Yet even from the test’s
early days, the Court cautioned it could serve only as guidance and not a
bright-line test. 96
In 1980, the Court faced its first religious display challenge since Lemon
in Stone v. Graham. 97 The Court invalidated a statute requiring the posting
of the Ten Commandments in every Kentucky public school classroom,
91. Id. at 619.
92. Id. at 621 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970)). The Court
distinguished this arrangement from those it had found permissible, where aid was paid to students
and their parents rather than the religious schools. Id.
93. Id. at 623.
94. See infra notes 100–103 and accompanying text for a discussion of the first exception,
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), and infra notes 108–110 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the second exception, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
95. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9, 16–17 (1989); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 485 (1986); Thornton v. Calder, 472 U.S. 703, 708 (1985);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123
(1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 235–36
(1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 358 (1975); Comm. for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 772–73 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
96. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741 (applying Lemon “[w]ith full recognition that these are no more than
helpful signposts”); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773 n.31 (restating Chief Justice Burger’s position that the
Lemon criteria should be “viewed as guidelines” (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678
(1971)); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394 (applying Lemon with the “caveat in mind” that “it provides ‘no
more than [a] helpful signpost[t]’ in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges” (quoting Hunt,
413 U.S. at 741)); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (explaining after introducing the Lemon test, “we have
repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area”).
97. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
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having found under the Lemon test that the statute had no secular legislative
purpose. 98 This was also the first Establishment Clause challenge since
Lemon where the Court found the state action to have an impermissible
purpose. 99
The Court’s decision just three years later in Marsh v. Chambers 100
marked the start of the Court’s selective use of Lemon. The Court avoided
mention of Lemon entirely and upheld Nebraska’s practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer, led by a chaplain paid with public funds. 101
The Court based its holding on the longstanding nature of the practice. 102 The
Court also reasoned the First Congress must not have intended for the
Establishment Clause to forbid legislative prayer, since it voted to appoint
and pay a chaplain for each chamber in the same week it voted to submit the
First Amendment to the states for approval.103
The Lemon test was, however, brought up in the dissenting opinion,
written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall. 104 The dissent
asserted the majority had effectively exempted legislative prayer from the
Establishment Clause on the basis of its “unique history,” rather than having
reshaped Establishment Clause doctrine. 105 The dissent found evidence of
this in the majority’s failure to apply any of the Court’s “formal ‘tests’” or
“settled doctrine” for evaluating such challenges, citing the Lemon test as
“the most commonly cited formulation.” 106 The dissent concluded that had
the Court applied the Lemon test, it would have found the legislative prayer
at issue to be a “clear violation” of the Clause, failing each of the three
prongs. 107
The approach of relaxing Lemon to uphold government action continued
in the Court’s next display case, Lynch v. Donnelly. 108 In a plurality opinion
written by Chief Justice Burger, the Court upheld a city’s inclusion of a

98. Id. at 41. The Court reasoned the Commandments’ pre-eminent religious nature could not
be overcome by any legislative statement of a secular purpose for their posting. Id. at 39. The Court
concluded the “[p]osting of religious text on the wall serves no such educational function,” unlike
using the Bible for “study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or the like.” Id. at
42. Rather, if the postings had any effect on schoolchildren, it would be to induce them to follow
the Commandments, which is not a secular objective. Id.
99. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.9. (2005).
100. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
101. Id. at 784.
102. Id. at 790–91. Nebraska had opened legislative sessions with prayer for over a century.
Id.
103. Id. at 790.
104. Id. at 796–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 795–96.
106. Id. at 796.
107. Id. at 796.
108. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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nativity scene (a “crèche”) in its annual Christmas display. 109 The opinion
effectively relaxed Lemon’s purpose prong by concluding the city’s purpose
(to celebrate the holiday and depict its origins) was legitimate, because it was
not wholly motivated by religious considerations. 110
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor articulated what would
become known as the “endorsement test,” which assigned a more specific
focus to the Lemon inquiries. 111 She described the effect prong as asking
whether the government action conveyed endorsement of religion,
considering the “objective” view of members of the display’s audience,
taking into account the words used themselves and the context of the display,
rather than subjective intent of the government. 112 The following year she
would clarify that assumed view: “The relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement” of religion. 113 The
endorsement test gained traction in a few subsequent cases, and the concept
of the viewpoint assumed by the test would be a source of controversy among
the Justices. 114
The Court reverted to its practice of invalidating a governmental display
when applying the Lemon test in its next two display challenges, Wallace v.
Jaffree 115 and Edwards v. Aguillard. 116 These cases marked the second and
third instances of all Establishment Clause cases where the Court found an
impermissible government purpose under Lemon. 117 Although neither
majority opinion applied the endorsement test, the Wallace Court cited to
Justice O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence in describing the purpose inquiry as
“whether government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of

109. Id. at 687.
110. Id. at 681, 681 n.6. The plurality reasoned that such a “passive” symbol of a “particular
historic religious event” was not enough to taint the entire exhibit “engendering a friendly
community spirit of goodwill in keeping with the season.” Id. at 685–86.
111. Id. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice O’Connor noted the endorsement test was
consistent with the purpose and effects prongs of the Lemon test. Id.
112. Id. Justice O’Connor applied her test to conclude the display could be objectively
perceived to celebrate a public holiday, and that the community would not take the declaration of a
public holiday to be a government endorsement of religion. Id. at 692. Rather, the display amounted
to a permissible “acknowledgement” rather than an endorsement of religion. Id. at 692–93.
113. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
114. See infra notes 123–131, 139–142, 166, 174, 179 and accompanying text.
115. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The Court invalidated a statute authorizing a period of silence for
meditation or prayer in all public schools due to its non-secular purpose. Id. at 40, 56.
116. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The Court invalidated a statute that forbid the teaching of evolution
in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in “creation science” and vice versa, finding it
had no legitimate secular purpose. Id. at 581, 586.
117. McCreary v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 859 n.9 (2005).
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religion.” 118 And Justice O’Connor applied the test in her Wallace
concurrence. 119
Through this period, the Court’s application of Lemon had been used
invariably to strike down religious displays by the government. In the two
cases where the Court avoided strict (or any) application of the test, Marsh
and Lynch, it upheld the challenged expression. 120
D. The Court Shifts Away from Lemon and Toward More Deferential
Analyses to Uphold Religious Displays
Beginning in 1989, the Court’s Establishment Clause opinions—across
all types of challenges, and those evaluating religious displays specifically—
took a marked turn away from application of the Lemon test. 121 This shift
toward more deferential approaches relying on context permitted more
religious displays. 122 The Court rarely invoked Lemon or relied on previous
cases decided under its application. But when it did, it invalidated the
challenged actions. 123
The first case of this period, County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union Ass’n, 124 marked the beginning of the Court’s turn toward a
more contextual approach to religious display challenges. The Court adopted
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test in lieu of Lemon, finding it provided a
sensible, concrete approach for evaluating religious displays. 125
118. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 n.42 (citing Lynch v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
119. Id. at 76–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
120. See supra notes 100–110 and accompanying text.
121. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019) (“In many cases, this
Court has either expressly declined to apply the test or has simply ignored it.” (citing Trump v.
Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Hosanna-Tabor
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544
U.S. 709 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Rosenberger v.
Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet,
512 U.S. 687 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993))).
122. See discussion of Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), infra notes 135–143;
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), infra notes 144–160; Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700
(2010), infra notes 174–175; and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014), infra notes
176–180.
123. Justice Scalia articulated the Court’s selective use of the Lemon test as early as 1993,
explaining, “When we wish to strike down a practice [Lemon] forbids, we invoke it; when we wish
to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.” Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
124. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
125. Id. at 595–97. The Court noted although the Lemon test “ha[d] been applied regularly in
the Court’s later Establishment Clause cases,” its “subsequent decisions further . . . refined the
definition of governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion” to action “that has the
purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion.” Id. at 592.
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Without acknowledging it was doing so, the Court redefined the
endorsement test’s viewpoint from that of a singular, all-knowing observer,
to dual perspectives considering the views of both adherents and
nonadherents of the controlling religious denomination. 126 The Court applied
that methodology to the challenged displays: The county courthouse’s crèche
display and a menorah included in a display outside the city council. 127 The
Court considered factors such as the prominence of the crèche and menorah
in each display, whether the objects were capable of communicating a
religious message on their own, whether there were other features of the
displays, and if so, whether they furthered a secular or religious theme. 128
The Court found there were no mitigating secular features to overcome the
crèche’s religious nature, and that its prominent placement by the main
staircase in the county building communicated a message of government
approval of religion. 129 In contrast, the Court concluded the overall message
of the display containing the menorah was secular.130 The Court considered
the menorah’s significance not only as a religious symbol, but as a symbol
for a holiday with “religious and secular dimensions,” 131 the display’s more
prominent inclusion of a Christmas tree, and its inclusion of a sign reading
“during the holiday season the city salutes liberty.” 132 The Allegheny Court’s
definition of the reasonable observer appeared to have raised the bar for a
religious display to survive, in that it specifically inquired about the view of
nonadherents, and consequently, struck down one of the displays. The
varying definitions of the reasonable observer would continue to impact the
outcome in cases decided by the endorsement test.
In Lee v. Weisman 133 the Court continued the trend of avoiding formal
application of the Lemon test, but nonetheless relied on cases that had been
decided under the test to invalidate the practice of nonsectarian prayer at
middle and high school graduation ceremonies. 134

126. Id. at 597 (explaining the court “must ascertain whether ‘the challenged governmental
action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by adherents of the controlling denominations as an
endorsement, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their individual religious choices’”).
127. Id. at 578.
128. Id. at 598–99.
129. Id. at 599–600, 611–20. However, because the court of appeals had found the menorah to
have an impermissible purpose, it did not assess the purpose or entanglement prongs. Id. at 620–
21. Upon finding a permissible secular purpose, the Court remanded that part of the case for
determination of whether the menorah violated those prongs. Id.
130. Id. at 620.
131. Id. at 614.
132. Id. at 619.
133. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
134. Id. at 586–87. The Court relied on its analyses of previous challenges to religious
expression in public secondary schools, such as School District of Abington v. Schempp and Engel
v. Vitale. Id. at 590, 592.
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Although Capitol Square v. Pinette 135 involved private expression in a
forum available for public use (rather than governmental speech),136 it
contained Justice O’Connor’s most detailed explanation of the endorsement
test’s “reasonable observer,” as well as an opposing view by Justice Stevens.
In the plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld state
action permitting the Ku Klux Klan to display an unattended cross on state
capitol grounds. 137 The plurality ignored Lemon and applied a distinct
analysis for cases of private expression, 138 rejecting the petitioners’ urging
that the Court should apply the endorsement test. 139
Justice O’Connor authored a concurring opinion to express her view of
the “reasonable, informed observer.” 140 In stark contrast to the notion
underlying the Allegheny Court’s reasonable observer, she asserted that in
Establishment Clause challenges, the Court’s “concern is with the political
community writ large,” and so “the endorsement inquiry is not about the
perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated nonadherents from the
discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe.” 141
From this, she concluded the reasonable observer should be similar to the
“reasonable person” in tort law, whose behavior is deemed ideal by members
of the community. 142 Most critically, she opined the reasonable observer
“must be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and
forum in which the religious display appears,” and the observer’s knowledge
should not be confined merely to what one can observe from looking at a
These discrepancies in reasonable observer definitions
display. 143
demonstrate the impact the viewpoint has on the outcome of the endorsement
test.
In Van Orden v. Perry, 144 the plurality, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, broadened the scope of permissible religious displays on
government property by eschewing all bright-line tests for evaluating
“passive monuments.” 145 The Court explained that over the past twenty-five

135. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
136. Id. at 760–61.
137. Id. at 770.
138. Id. at 762–63. Because it is not contemplated that the Cross in American Legion amounts
to private expression, the analysis employed by the Court is not relevant to this Note.
139. Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763–65 (1995).
140. Id. at 772–73 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 779.
142. Id. at 779–80.
143. Id. at 880.
144. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
145. Id. at 686. The Court never expressly defined “passive,” but the Court’s comparison of the
monument at issue to the Ten Commandments postings in Stone suggest it refers to the Van Orden
monument’s out-of-the-way location and non-imposing nature:
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years of Establishment Clause cases, it sometimes looked to Lemon, but more
recently had opted not to use it. 146 The Court expressly avoided discussion
of the test’s future and simply stated, “[W]e think [the Lemon test] not useful
in dealing with the sort of passive monument that Texas has erected on its
Capitol grounds.” 147
The Court upheld a monument inscribed with the Ten Commandments
on Texas state capitol grounds. 148 The monument had been donated to the
State forty years prior by the Eagles (“a national social, civic, and patriotic
organization“), 149 and the state land on which the monument was located
“contain[ed] [seventeen] monuments and [twenty-one] historical markers
commemorating the ‘people, ideals, and events that compose Texan
identity.’” 150 The Court focused on “the nature of the monument” and the
“Nation’s history” of acknowledging the role of religion in life, 151 to
conclude the monument bore significance to both religion and government. 152
As such, the monument was an appropriate inclusion in the capitol grounds
monuments, which “represent[] the several strands in the State’s political and
legal history.” 153
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment—the narrowest grounds
opinion 154—acknowledged that prior tests, including Lemon, “provide useful
guideposts—and might well lead to the same result the Court reach[ed],” but
“no exact formula can dictate a resolution” to borderline, fact-intensive cases,
The placement of the Ten Commandments monument on the Texas Statute Capitol
grounds is a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the text
confronted elementary school students every day. Indeed, Van Orden, the petitioner here,
apparently walked by the monument for a number of years before bringing this lawsuit.
Id. at 691.
146. Id. at 686 (noting that “[m]any of [the Court’s] recent cases simply have not applied
the Lemon test,” while “[o]thers have applied it.”).
147. Id. The plurality made no mention of the endorsement test either.
148. Id. at 681.
149. Id. at 682.
150. Id. at 681 (quoting Tex. H. Con. Res. 38, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2001)).
151. Id. at 686. As an example of this, the Court pointed out the posting of the Ten
Commandments in other public places such as in its own courtroom. Id. at 688.
152. Id. at 691–92.
153. Id.
154. As the narrowest grounds opinion, Justice Breyer’s opinion is considered the holding of
Van Orden. Under the Marks doctrine, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.’” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Since the plurality and dissenting
opinions in Van Orden were each joined by four Justices, Justice Breyer’s opinion, as the only
concurrence in the judgment, is the narrowest grounds opinion. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 677–78;
see also Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 205 (4th Cir. 2017), (“Justice
Breyer’s concurrence, however, is controlling because it is the narrowest ground upholding the
majority.”), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
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such as the instant case. 155 Justice Breyer opined that when dealing with a
monument on public land, the Court should not focus on the text alone, but
should look at “how the text is used” by “consider[ing] the context of the
display.” 156 Justice Breyer then considered the Eagles’s donation as the
means by which the display was erected, the display’s placement among
many other monuments with secular purposes, and that the monument had
never before been challenged in its forty years of existence, to conclude that:
(1) the state’s purpose was to promote a predominantly secular message, 157
(2) the public did not interpret the monument’s presence as governmental
endorsement of any particular religion or of religion over nonreligion, 158 and
thus (3) the monument was “unlikely to prove divisive.” 159 Justice Breyer
suggested that finding otherwise could “lead the law to exhibit a hostility
toward religion” and “create the very kind of religiously based divisiveness
that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.” 160
The very same day in McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky, 161 in stark contrast to Van Orden, the Court applied the
Lemon test to hold another display of the Ten Commandments on
government property violated the Establishment Clause. 162 In an opinion
written by Justice Souter, the Court held the posting of the text of the
Commandments in the county courthouse evinced a predominant purpose of
advancing religion. 163 It dismissed the county’s argument that Lemon’s
purpose inquiry should be retired, emphasizing that “[e]xamination of
purpose” is a cornerstone practice for evaluating governmental action,164 and
“scrutinizing purpose does make practical sense, as in Establishment Clause
analysis, where an understanding of official objective emerges from readily
discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis of a drafter’s heart of
hearts.” 165 The Court further rejected the county’s argument that only
evidence of the government’s most recent purpose should be assessed. 166
With an implicit nod to the endorsement test, the Court referenced the
“reasonable observer” several times to emphasize the previous point:
“Reasonable observers have reasonable memories, and [the Court’s]
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 701.
Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 702 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963)).
Id. at 704.
Id.
545 U.S. 844 (2005).
Id. at 850, 859.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 866.
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precedents sensibly forbid an observer ‘to turn a blind eye to the context in
which [the] policy arose.’” 167
Van Orden’s casting off of Lemon was referenced only in the dissenting
opinion of McCreary, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. 168 The dissent argued the principle
underlying the Lemon analysis—that the “First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between . . . religion and nonreligion” 169—was
based only on “the Court’s own say-so,” 170 and had been effectively
discredited by the Court itself:
[A] majority of the Justices on the current Court (including at least
one Member of today’s majority) have, in separate opinions,
repudiated the brain-spun “Lemon test” that embodies the
supposed principle of neutrality between religion and irreligion.
And it is discredited because the Court has not had the courage (or
the foolhardiness) to apply the neutrality principle consistently. 171
Van Orden and McCreary signaled the height of the Justices’ disagreement
on Lemon. These were also the final two religious display cases 172 Justice
O’Connor would hear before leaving the Court in 2006. 173
The Court disregarded the Lemon test and applied a more deferential,
context specific analysis to rule in favor of the challenged religious displays
in the two display cases following Van Orden and McCreary. In Salazar v.
Buono, 174 the plurality, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, concluded
the district court erred in invalidating a cross on public land based on its
religious symbolism alone, ignoring history and context that supported a

167. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (second
alteration in original).
168. Id. at 890 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 889 (quoting id. at 860 (plurality opinion)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 890 (citations omitted).
172. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary, 545 U.S. 844.
173. Lawrence Hurley, Trail-blazing Retired U.S. Justice O’Connor Says She Has Dementia,
REUTERS (Oct. 23, 2018), https://news.yahoo.com/trail-blazing-retired-u-justice-oconnor-says-she142057501.html (“O’Connor . . . was appointed to the nine-member court by Republican former
President Ronald Reagan during his first year in office and she retired in 2006.”)
174. 559 U.S. 700 (2010). The Court addressed a challenge to a federal statute that would
transfer a cross and the public grounds on which it stood to a private party but did not formally
decide on the constitutionality of the cross since it was not raised on appeal. Id. at 706. The
challenge to the statute was based on the contention that the statute was a “sham aimed at keeping
the cross in place,” after the district court had found its placement on public land to be
unconstitutional. Id. at 710. The Court ultimately remanded the case for determining whether there
was a less drastic form of relief than striking down a congressional act. Id. at 721–22.
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secular purpose. 175 Similarly, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, 176 the Court
did not apply the Lemon test and deferred to history to uphold the town’s
legislative prayer practice.177 In a plurality opinion written by Justice
Kennedy, the Court relied on Marsh as the most on point case, 178 explaining
its teaching that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted ‘by reference
to historical practices and understandings’” 179 and that “it is not necessary to
define the precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows
that the specific practice is permitted.” 180 Buono and Town of Greece
bolstered the Court’s flexibility to uphold a governmental religious act where
it has been historically accepted.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In American Legion v. Humanist Ass’n, a six-Justice plurality held that
the location of the Cross on public land and its maintenance by a public
agency did not violate the Establishment Clause. In an opinion written by
Justice Alito, the plurality grounded its holding in the Cross’s longstanding
existence as a monument commemorating WWI, 181 the lack of evidence that
a cross was selected for the memorial to express exclusion of other
religions, 182 and that the removal or alteration of the Cross would be seen by
many as an act of hostility toward religion rather than an act of neutrality. 183
175. Id. at 721. The Court cited to Justice Breyer’s Van Orden concurrence in the judgment to
posit the complete context of a monument must be considered and stated the reasonable observer
test would require “the message conveyed by the cross [to] be assessed in the context of all relevant
factors.” Id. (citing Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700 (Breyer, J., concurring)). The Court concluded a
Latin cross was not just a symbol of Christianity, but also a symbol commemorating heroes, and
that in the instant case, the cross evoked the scene of fields of crosses overseas, marking the graves
of fallen American soldiers. Id.
176. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
177. Id. at 587, 591–92. The Court did, however, quote Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the
judgment in Van Orden, saying, “A test that would sweep away what has so long been settled would
create new controversy and begin anew the very divisions along religious lines that the
Establishment Clause seeks to prevent.” Id. at 577 (quoting Van Orden, 545 US. at 702–04 (Breyer,
J., concurring)).
178. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 575–77.
179. Id. at 576 (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 670
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
180. Id. at 577. As an apparent afterthought, the Court referenced the endorsement test to bolster
its holding, explaining:
It is presumed that the reasonable observer is acquainted with this tradition and
understands that its purposes are to lend gravity to public proceedings and to
acknowledge the place religion holds in the lives of many private citizens, not to afford
government an opportunity to proselytize or force truant constituents into the pews.
Id. at 587.
181. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019).
182. Id. at 2089–90.
183. Id. at 2090.
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In determining how to analyze the Cross, the Court reasoned that in
cases of longstanding religious monuments or practices, application of the
Lemon test is inappropriate due to four key obstacles 184: (1) it can be difficult
if not impossible to discern the original purpose of a monument or practice
that was created long ago; (2) such purposes associated with a monument or
practice can change or multiply over time so as to no longer be religious; (3)
the effect of a monument or practice on observers can similarly change over
time, such as when an originally religious monument evolves into a historic
landmark; and (4) removal of such established monuments or practices may
not appear to be neutral acts but instead evidence of the government’s
hostility toward religion. 185 The Court concluded that those considerations
give rise to a “strong presumption of constitutionality” for “established,
religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and practices.” 186
The Court found that each of the four obstacles was present in the case
of the Cross. 187 First, because of the passage of time, it is impossible to
determine whether a cross’s association with WWI was the sole or dominant
reason for its inclusion in every WWI memorial that features it. 188 Second,
the purposes of maintaining the Cross and surrounding lands have changed
as the government is motivated by concerns of traffic safety and the
additional preservation of other monuments nearby. 189 Lastly, “an alteration
like the one entertained by the Fourth Circuit—amputating the arms of the
Cross—would be seen by many as profoundly disrespectful.” 190
The Court cited to Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece v. Galloway,
emphasizing its decision to ignore the Lemon test and take “a more modest
approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for
guidance.” 191 In those cases, the Court was persuaded by the longstanding
nature of the prayer practice, as well as its view “that the Framers considered
legislative prayer a benign acknowledgement of religion’s role in society.” 192
The Court had deduced in these cases that the Framers intended the
Establishment Clause to center on respecting a diversity of religions and
promoting their peaceful coexistence. 193
The Court attributed significant weight to the Cross’s secular function.
It explained that crosses took on secular meaning for commemorating WWI,
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 2081–82.
Id. at 2082–84.
Id. at 2085.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2085–86.
Id. at 2086 (citation omitted).
Id. at 2087.
Id. (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014)).
Id. at 2089.
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and the Cross itself began with that meaning 194 and acquired historical
importance in the community and as other commemorative monuments were
added nearby. 195 The Court noted there was no evidence other religions or
persons of other races were excluded in the construction of the monument. 196
The Court also considered that because it is “natural and appropriate” for
commemorative monuments to “invoke the symbols that signify what death
mean[s]” for those whom they honor, it is appropriate for a cross to be the
feature of the memorial, since it “marks the graves of so many of [the fallen
soldiers’] comrades near the battlefields where they fell.” 197 The Court
concluded that although the cross is a Christian symbol, the symbolism is not
enough to overshadow all the secular meanings associated with the Cross. 198
Finally, it noted that any destruction or removal of the Cross would not be
seen by many as an act to maintain neutrality. 199
Five Justices took part in concurring opinions. Justice Breyer, joined
by Justice Kagan, 200 authored a concurring opinion that argued “[t]he case
would be different . . . if there were evidence that the organizers had
‘deliberately disrespected’ members of minority faiths or if the Cross had
been erected only recently, rather than in the aftermath of World War I.” 201
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the
inapplicability of the Lemon test both to the present and past Establishment
Clause cases and to point out that those who object to the Cross have recourse
outside of the courts through the Maryland Legislature. 202 Justice Kagan
wrote a concurrence in part arguing (1) the Lemon test’s focus on purposes
and effects is still “crucial” for evaluating Establishment Clause cases, even
if “rigid application” of the test is not always useful; and (2) the role of history
in evaluating Establishment Clause cases should be decided on a case-bycase basis. 203
194. Id. (“Due in large part to the image of the simple wooden crosses that originally marked
the graves of American soldiers killed in the war, the cross became a symbol of their sacrifice, and
the design of the Bladensburg Cross must be understood in light of that background. That the cross
originated as a Christian symbol and retains that meaning in many contexts does not change the fact
that the symbol took on an added secular meaning when used in World War I memorials.”).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 2089–90. The Court found “no evidence” that “the names of any Jewish soldiers
from the area were deliberately left off the list on the memorial” or that “the names of any Jewish
soldiers were included on the Cross against the wishes of their families,” and the Court did “know
that one of the local American Legion leaders responsible for the Cross’s construction was a Jewish
veteran.” Additionally, the names listed on the Cross included both black and white soldiers. Id.
197. Id. at 2090.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2090–91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2092–94 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 2094 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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Justice Thomas authored a concurrence in the judgment, asserting the
Establishment Clause should not be incorporated against the States, and even
if it were, the Cross “does not involve the type of actual legal coercion”—
such as mandating church attendance or levying taxes for church revenue—
“that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion.” 204 Justice
Thomas also would have overruled the use of the Lemon test in all contexts,
and did not join the plurality because “it does not adequately clarify the
appropriate standard for Establishment Clause cases.” 205 Justice Gorsuch
joined by Justice Thomas, also wrote a concurrence in the judgment. 206
Justice Gorsuch contended the present suit and similar challenges should be
dismissed for lack of standing, because the “offended observer” theory of
standing has no basis in law, since “offense”—the only injury alleged by
plaintiffs in this case—has never been held to satisfy injury-in-fact. 207
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justice
Sotomayor, would have held the Cross an unconstitutional endorsement of
religion. 208 The dissent disagreed with the plurality on three main grounds,
concluding: (1) the foundation of the Cross’s secular associations claimed by
the plurality were actually rooted in religion; (2) even if those secular
meanings were legitimate, the religious meaning of a cross cannot be
overcome by secularity; and (3) the Establishment Clause requires
government neutrality between religion and nonreligion, meaning the
government cannot take action recognizing any particular religion. The
dissent began by stating the Court recognized long ago that the Establishment
Clause demands not only “neutrality among religious faiths”—just as the
plurality emphasized—but also neutrality “between religion and
nonreligion.” 209 Justice Ginsburg argued the Cross’s prominence on public
land, given crosses’ indisputably Christian association, “elevates Christianity
over other faiths, and religion over nonreligion.” 210
The dissent described the cross not only as the principal symbol of
Christianity around the world but also as an exclusively Christian symbol, 211
“embodying the ‘central theological claim of Christianity: that the son of God
died on the cross, that he rose from the dead, and that his death and
resurrection offer the possibility of eternal life.’” 212 The dissent asserted this
204. Id. at 2094–96 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 2097–98.
206. Id. at 2098 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2105 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2104.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 2107.
212. Id. at 2104 (citing Brief for Baptist Joint Comm. for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici
Curiae supporting Petitioners).
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background is precisely the reason that crosses have been used to mark the
graves of Christian soldiers, and because of this, “using the cross as a war
memorial does not transform it into a secular symbol, as the Courts of
Appeals have uniformly recognized.” 213 In relation to the Cross specifically,
the dissent noted that the religious context under which it was constructed
was apparent as early as the dedication ceremony, where the keynote speaker
and reporters used religious analogies. 214 All of these facts, the dissent
suggested, invalidated the Commission’s argument that crosses became a
“‘universal symbol’ of World War I sacrifice,” transcending religious
lines. 215
Finally, the dissent opined that holding the Cross unconstitutional would
not “inevitably require the destruction of other cross-shaped memorials
throughout the country,” 216 since the appearance of religious symbols
associated with individuals in a cemetery is not akin to, and thus not
problematic like their general appearance on publicly owned grounds. 217 The
dissent also argued that holding unconstitutional a monument’s existence on
publicly owned property would not necessarily require destroying the
monument, but rather that the remedy should be “context[-]specific” and can
include relocation to private land or transfer of ownership to a private
party. 218
IV. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that although the outcome of American Legion v.
American Humanist Ass’n is consistent with relevant precedent, 219 the
Court’s analysis set a dangerous standard by disregarding all of its existing
tests and effectively exempting longstanding religious displays from
Establishment Clause scrutiny. 220 It was unnecessary for the Court to take
this new path to hold the Cross constitutional; the most appropriate means
for analyzing the Cross would have been the endorsement test. 221

213. Id. To support this point, Justice Ginsburg recounted that when the War Department was
deciding on the headstones to be used for fallen American soldiers in Europe, there was never any
debate that the cross and Star of David were “sectarian gravemarkers, and therefore appropriate only
for soldiers who adhered to those faiths.” Id. at 2110.
214. Id. at 2109; see supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
215. Id. at 2111–12.
216. Id. at 2112 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Md.-Nat’l Capital Park and Planning Comm’n at
52).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See infra Section IV.A.
220. See infra Section IV.B.
221. See infra Section IV.C.
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This Note also argues the Court should apply a “modified” endorsement
test in future display cases to better serve the Establishment Clause goal of
preventing political divisiveness along religious lines. 222 This test would
assign to the “reasonable observer” only the knowledge surrounding a display
possessed by those persons most frequently coming into contact with it. 223
This approach would have held the Cross unconstitutional, since most
persons coming into contact with the Cross are likely not aware of its secular
history and cannot see its secular features. 224
A. Averting the Lemon Test and Holding the Cross Constitutional Was
Consistent with Relevant Case Law
The Court’s decision to uphold the Cross was consistent with its most
relevant religious display cases—particularly Van Orden v. Perry—in
avoiding application of the Lemon test and deferring to history to uphold the
challenged monument. In the face of seemingly conflicting decisions from
Van Orden and McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of
Kentucky, 225 the American Legion Court reasonably followed more closely
in the analytical footsteps of Van Orden as the more factually similar case. 226
Van Orden evaluated a longstanding religious display that had gone
unchallenged for forty years, and was erected by a private organization on
public property. 227 In contrast, the displays in McCreary were posted in 1999
and challenged only months later, and the idea to post them came directly
222. See infra Section IV.D.1.
223. Id.
224. See infra Section IV.D.2.
225. See Edith Brown Clement, Public Displays of Affection . . . for God: Religious Monuments
after McCreary and Van Orden, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 231, 246 (2009) (“Most courts of
appeals have concluded that the Lemon tripartite test of purpose, effect, and entanglement still stands
after Van Orden, yet this conclusion has not come without a struggle.”); Frank J. Ducoat,
Inconsistent Guideposts: Van Orden, McCreary County, and the Continuing Need for a Single and
Predictable Establishment Clause Test, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 14, 12–15 (2007) (arguing
that either Van Orden or McCreary could be applied to religious display cases after the day of those
decisions, and a review of lower court decisions on religious displays on public grounds in the two
terms following the decisions showed the courts were choosing either case, and with no
consistency); Brett B. Larsen, No Closer to Clarity: The Establishment Clause and the Supreme
Stumble in Van Orden v. Perry, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 155, 170 (2006) (“[I]f Lemon or its descendents
[sic] are ‘not useful’ enough to even be applied in two cases on the same day, they should be
overturned and replaced, not ignored.” (footnotes omitted)).
226. See CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22223, PUBLIC DISPLAY OF THE
TEN COMMANDMENTS 1, 5 (2008) for an explanation reconciling Van Orden and McCreary on their
distinguishable facts. Brougher notes the displays in McCreary were created by county officials,
whereas the Texas state legislature was uninvolved in the creation of the monument in Van Orden.
Id. She also emphasizes that the McCreary displays were posted in government buildings and
promoted by county officials, while the Van Orden monument was placed in a more “passive”
location, among dozens of other monuments. Id.
227. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2005).
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from government officials. 228 Like the monument in Van Orden, the Cross
had been around for decades, and the plan to erect it originated with
individual citizens and was completed by a private organization. 229 Van
Orden was the more on-point case for analyzing the Cross.
Not only were the facts surrounding the Cross more similar to those of
the Van Orden display, but the Court’s general treatment of religious displays
has erred on the side of deference when the display is longstanding and/or
when the display has at least some secular aspects or purposes. As the
Congressional Research Service observed in 2008, “Generally, the Court has
upheld public displays of religious symbols where the display is set in
diversified context.” 230 In the Court’s decisions in Salazar v. Buono and
Town of Greece v. Galloway, the two display cases following Van Orden and
McCreary, it did not apply the Lemon test and deferred to the historical
acceptance of a longstanding religious monument 231 and a legislative prayer
practice. 232 Relying on McCreary and/or applying the Lemon test in
American Legion would have run counter to the relevant case law. 233 Van
Orden marked a clear shift away from Lemon and toward an even more
deferential review for longstanding religious displays, and the American
Legion Court was faithful to that precedent.
B. The “Presumption of Constitutionality” Effectively Exempts
Longstanding Religious Displays from Establishment Clause
Scrutiny and Weakens Establishment Clause Protections
The Court’s creation of a “presumption of constitutionality” is
effectively an exemption for longstanding religious displays from
Establishment Clause scrutiny. The Court’s discussion of four characteristics
of the Cross—also described as obstacles in the analysis of longstanding
monuments—formed the crux of its analysis. 234 The Court did not explain
how the presumption of constitutionality could be overcome, 235 making its
logic essentially circular: Four obstacles present in cases of longstanding
monuments lead to a presumption of constitutionality, which therefore
applies to the Cross. And because those four obstacles are present in the case
228. McCreary v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851–52 (2005).
229. See supra Part I.
230. BROUGHER, supra note 226 at 6.
231. See supra notes 174–175 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 176–180 and accompanying text.
233. See Leading Cases, American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, 133 HARV. L. REV.
262, 271 (2019) (“[T]he Court was right to reject Lemon . . . .”).
234. See supra notes 184–186 and accompanying text. The Court runs through these factors a
second time in reaching its holding. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089–
90 (2019).
235. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085.
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of the Cross, it is constitutional. Thus, if a monument or practice is
longstanding, it is exempt from substantive analysis under the Establishment
Clause.
As evidence of this presumption, the takeaway by lower courts,
scholars, and advocates for both sides of the debate on separation of church
and state, has been that longstanding monuments are exempted, rather than
shielded by a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality. 236 In a subsequent
case in which the Third Circuit upheld a county seal with a large cross at its
focal point, the court relied on American Legion to say that “the presumption
applies to all ‘established, religiously expressive monuments, symbols, and
practices,’” and that the county’s seventy-five-year-old seal “checks those
boxes.” 237 University of Virginia School of Law professor Douglas Laycock
agreed with the holding, characterizing such longstanding symbols as
“protected by a grandfather clause for things adopted or erected long ago.” 238
Advocates of the separation of church and state echoed this takeaway in
lamenting the Third Circuit’s holding and its reliance on American Legion:
“The judges act like the only way a Christian cross on a government product
can be illegal is if everyone in government gets together, holds hands, sings
a hymn, and publicly announces how the symbol will honor the Son of God.
Everything else gets a free pass.” 239 And those celebrating the decision have
proclaimed: “In light of the [American Legion] decision, all government
officials should recognize that it’s permissible to continue on with religious
traditions, practices or displays that have been used in our country’s
history.” 240 Thus, American Legion will lead courts to uphold any
longstanding governmental religious display or practice without subjecting it
to any scrutiny. 241

236. See infra notes 237–240 and accompanying text.
237. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. County of Lehigh, 933 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir.
2019).
238. P.J. D’Annunzio, Cross on Lehigh County Seal and Flag Not Discriminatory, Third Circuit
Says, LAW.COM (Aug. 08, 2019), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/2019/08/08/cross-onlehigh-county-seal-and-flag-not-discriminatory-third-circuit-says/.
239. Hemant Mehta, Appeals Court: Christian Logo for Lehigh County (PA) Doesn’t Promote
ATHEIST
(Aug.
8,
2019),
Religion,
FRIENDLY
https://friendlyatheist.patheos.com/2019/08/08/appeals-court-christian-logo-for-lehigh-county-padoesnt-promote-religion/.
240. Jorge Gomez, First Test: SCOTUS’ Landmark Bladensburg Decision Helps Restore Fallen
Police Officer Memorial, FIRST LIBERTY (Aug. 9, 2019), https://firstliberty.org/news/policeofficer-memorial/.
241. See Garret Epps, Why Is This Cross-Shaped Memorial Constitutional?, ATLANTIC (Feb.
19, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/02/aha-v-american-legion-marylandpeace-cross-stake/583024/ (“The answer [to why the Cross is constitutional] will shape how courts
around the country respond to monuments, official and ‘voluntary’ public prayer, and other official
and semiofficial manifestations of popular faith and belief.”).
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This effective exemption is not a positive development in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 242 While it may simplify adjudication, it permits the
Court to ignore evolving societal views and circumstances in its analysis.
This is because such deference to history is founded on the assumption that
practices in effect and unchallenged for a long time must be constitutional. 243
But our nation’s history provides the glaring counterargument. As Professor
Arnold Lowey explained, “Nobody asked blacks about segregated schools,
and nobody asked nontheists about the invocation.” 244 The fact that such a
practice has occurred for so long does not mean it does not communicate
government endorsement of religion. 245 American Legion’s “presumption of
constitutionality” absolves the Court from having to consider this reality.
C. The Court Should Have Used the Endorsement Test to Analyze the
Cross
The most appropriate test for analyzing governmental religious
displays—including those like the Cross—is the endorsement test, since it
expressly addresses the chief risk posed by such displays: communication of
government endorsement of religion. Accordingly, this Section explains why
the American Legion Court should have analyzed the Cross under the
endorsement test. Of the Court’s existing tests, this test most directly
addresses the issue of government endorsement of religion communicated by
a display, 246 and the impression of government endorsement of religion was
the central claim giving rise to the lawsuit.247 This Section then explains how
under the “reasonable observer” viewpoint currently embedded in the

242. Notably, this development is in direct contrast to other Justices’ and scholars’ suggestion
that there should be a strong presumption against religious displays on government property. See
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2105–06 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“[W]hen a cross is displayed on public property, the government may be presumed to endorse its
religious content.”); Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 650 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Establishment Clause should be
construed to create a strong presumption against the display of religious symbol on public
property.”); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 602, 708 (1971) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In my
judgment, at the very least, the Establishment Clause has created a strong presumption against the
display of religious symbols on public property.”); Larsen, supra note 225, at 165–66.
243. See Joel S. Jacobs, Endorsement as “Adoptive Action”: A Suggested Definition of, and an
Argument for, Justice O’Connor’s Establishment Clause Test, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 29, 50
(1994) (“Endorsement of religion should be prohibited regardless of how long the particular
endorsement has been tolerated. Courts have generally upheld long-standing religious state
practices, even when they represented an obvious confluence of religion and the state.”)
244. Id. at 50–51 (quoting Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O’Connor’s Insight,
64 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (1986)).
245. Jacobs, supra note 243, at 50.
246. See infra Section IV.C.1.
247. See infra Section IV.C.2.
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endorsement test, the Cross still would have been held constitutional, since
the observer would be aware of context and history that evince the secular
purpose of the private citizens who erected the Cross, as well as the
government’s secular purpose in acquiring and maintaining the Cross.248
1. The Endorsement Test Is the Court’s Most Appropriate Test for
Religious Displays
In challenges to governmental religious displays, the Establishment
Clause issue most strongly implicated is the question of whether the display
communicates government endorsement of religion. 249 Displays are
typically physical things that do not involve significant material assistance to
religious organizations; 250 yet unlike subsidies or legal protections, displays
are often easily detected by most of the public. The most pertinent question
is therefore whether observers infer the government favors religion. The
endorsement test, originally articulated by Justice O’Connor in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly 251 and adopted shortly thereafter by the
Court in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Ass’n, 252
most directly addresses this issue 253 by examining not only what the
government intends to convey, but the message actually conveyed. 254
Determinative in the outcome of the test is the “reasonable observer”
viewpoint it assumes. 255 Justice O’Connor defined this as a person “deemed
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
248. See infra Section IV.C.3.
249. See Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989) (“[O]ur
present task is to determine whether the display of the crèche and the menorah, in their respective
‘particular physical settings,’ has the effect of endorsing or disapproving religious beliefs.”); Lynch
v Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The central issue in this case is
whether Pawtucket has endorsed Christianity by its display of the crèche.”).
250. Admittedly—and as is true in the case of the Cross—the government’s maintenance of a
religious display might require the use of public funds. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
However, this use of public funds is distinguishable from subsidy programs because the religious
organization is not the recipient of the funds.
251. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The second and more direct
infringement [of the Establishment Clause] is government endorsement or disapproval of religion.
Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.”).
252. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595.
253. Id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he endorsement test asks the right question about
governmental practices challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged
practices involving the display of religious symbols.”); see also Elliott M. Berman, Endorsing the
Supreme Court’s Decision to Endorse Endorsement, 24 COLUM. J. L. & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1, 25
(1991) (“Perhaps the greatest proof that the endorsement test is workable in practice is that several
circuit courts have employed it in considering challenges to public displays.”).
254. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
255. Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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religious display appears,” 256 and “familiar with ‘implementation of’
government action.” 257
Although the Court has used the endorsement test only a few times since
Allegheny, 258 “[l]ower federal courts and state courts have applied the test in
hundreds of cases to evaluate the constitutionality of many types of religious
symbols and displays.” 259 Importantly, unlike the Lemon test, the
endorsement test takes into account whether government action
communicates endorsement, even if the government’s action does not
actually advance religion260 or expressly endorse it. Even in the days of
Lemon’s routine application, the Court appeared to recognize the importance
of the impression of government endorsement of religion. 261 For instance,
the Court’s early holdings sometimes hinged on the methods through which
the government executed the challenged policies, perhaps because different
methods, although achieving the same result, would have conveyed more or
less problematic impressions of the government’s view of religion. 262 But
the Lemon test—“which focus[ed] on the objective purpose and effect of a
statute”—could not have explained such a distinction when neither the
government’s purpose nor the effect of its policy differed between various
means of execution. 263
Additionally, the endorsement test considers the history of a display, as
compared to Lemon and other tests that cannot explain decisions upholding
longstanding religious practices by the government. 264 Because the

256. Id.
257. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
258. The test appears to have been applied or invoked since Allegheny in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), Capitol Square, 515 U.S at 753, and McCreary, 545
U.S. at 844. Jay D. Wexler, The Endorsement Court, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 269, 269
n.42, 270 (2006).
259. See Wexler, supra note 258, at 264 (footnote omitted).
260. See Jacobs, supra note 243, at 35 (explaining that under the endorsement test, as opposed
to the Lemon test, “how state action affects religion is no longer important. Rather, the endorsement
test focuses on how people perceive the relationship between the state and religion”).
261. Berman, supra note 253, at 10–12.
262. For example, in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the Court upheld a
statute requiring public school districts to loan books to children attending private schools,
emphasizing the loans were made directly to students, rather than to the parochial schools—even
though the final objective effect of either arrangement (parochial school students receive free
textbooks thanks to public school district funds) would have been the same. Berman, supra note
253 at 10–11.
263. Berman, supra note 253, at 10–12.
264. See id. at 17 (“Under the pure Lemon test, history should not influence whether or not a
statute passes constitutional muster. The fact that a statute has been on the books for many years
does not affect whether its objective purpose or effect advances religion, or whether it creates
excessive entanglement with religion. Under the endorsement test . . . the importance of history is
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endorsement test takes account of what observers know of the context of a
display, that analysis will often include its history. 265 Thus, the test allows
the Court to stick to a course of analysis even when evaluating extremely old
practices or displays, rather than adding more confusion to the jurisprudence
and further infuriating opponents by simply expressing a decision to exempt
an action because it has been in practice for a long time. Of course, the
reverse is true as well: When the test results in the removal or alteration of a
longstanding monument based on its history, supporters may find it unfair
when the monument had also assumed communal significance by virtue of
its long existence. However, the community may decide to erect a new
monument in its place not burdened by the original’s problematic history. 266
Accordingly, the appropriate test for an Establishment Clause challenge to a
religious display, and particularly a longstanding one like the Cross, is the
endorsement test. 267
2. American Legion Is About Implied Government Endorsement of
Religion
Since the very beginning of the AHA’s lawsuit challenging the Cross,
the implication of government endorsement of religion, and Christianity
specifically, was the driving force of arguments from the plaintiffs, 268
evident because when a reasonable observer judges a government action, the tradition or novelty of
the act is central to his or her analysis.” (footnotes omitted)).
265. Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 630 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he ‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice is relevant because it provides part of the
context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a challenged governmental practice
conveys a message of endorsement of religion.”); see Wexler, supra note 258, at 269 (“The various
opinions in Allegheny . . . make clear that the entire context of the challenged display, particularly
its historical context, is important for evaluating the display’s constitutionality.”).
266. For arguments challenging the merits of this position, see supra notes 242–243 and
accompanying text. See also Maha Hilal, Confederate Statutes Aren’t About History, US NEWS
(Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/civil-wars/articles/2017-08-21/confederatestatues-honor-americas-racist-past-and-present, for an argument against the ‘historic’ value of
Confederate monuments. “Monuments aren’t textbooks meant to teach history: They’re structures
erected to valorize individuals and the values for which they stood. . . . [T]hey’re cultural artifacts
that exist as a testament to whose contributions we value and whose we don’t.” Id.
267. See Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S 753, 772 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In my
view, ‘the endorsement test asks the right question about governmental practices challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds, including challenged practices involving the display of religious
symbols.’” (quoting Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 628); Marci A. Hamilton, The Endorsement Factor, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 349, 355 (2011) (“It is my view that ‘endorsement’ is a new factor . . . and that it is
visionary and crucially important in this era of religious terrorism and triumphalism.”); Jacobs,
supra note 243, at 72 (“The line . . . between what is likely to communicate and what is not, is
represented by the endorsement test . . . . Other tests do not adequately protect the values at issue in
the Establishment Clause.”); Wexler, supra note 258, at 277 (“[T]he endorsement test . . . generally
asks the correct question about the constitutional propriety of religious symbols and displays.”).
268. For example, in his complaint to the district court, Mr. Lowe states that he “believes that
the Bladensburg Cross associates a Christian religious symbol with the State and gives the
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organizations supporting them, 269 and members of the media believing the
Cross to be unconstitutional. 270 It was also on endorsement grounds the
Fourth Circuit held the Cross unconstitutional, as well as the grounds for
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions of the appeals
court. 271
Additionally, the implication of governmental endorsement of religion
was the primary reason Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the Court and would
have held the Cross unconstitutional. 272 As she explained in the dissent,
“when a cross is displayed on public property, the government may be
presumed to endorse its religious content.” 273 She further explained the
presumption could be overcome by a setting that “negates any message of
endorsement of that content,” such as a museum, or a history teacher covering
the Protestant Reformation, but that the Cross was in no such setting. 274
Finally, in the Court’s past religious display cases, the primary issue was
whether the displays communicated the government’s endorsement of
religion. For instance, in Lynch, the Court addressed whether the city’s
display of a crèche communicated its endorsement of Christianity. 275 In
impression that the State supports and approves of Christianity, as opposed to other religions, and
that the state may even prefer Christians and Christianity over other religions.” Complaint at 3,
Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 147 F. Supp. 3d 373 (D. Md. 2015) (No. cv-14550). In its Brief to the Fourth Circuit, AHA emphasized the Cross’s “enormous” size and
prominent location in asking whether “the court err[ed] in concluding [the] Cross does not have the
effect of endorsing Christianity.” Brief of Appellant at *1, Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l
Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 201 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 15-2597).
269. Organizations filing amici briefs in support of AHA argued the Cross “‘conveys a strong
message of exclusion and secondary status’ to ‘members of minority faiths.’” Thomas R. Ascik,
Does a War-Memorial Cross Violate the Establishment Clause?, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/peace-cross-supreme-court-case-establishment-clause2/.
270. Editorial: The Supreme Court Shouldn’t Bless a Giant Cross on Public Property, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-scotus-cross-20190228story.html (“The right question for the court is whether a religious symbol on public property
endorses one religion over others. The Peace Cross clearly does.”); S.M., Cross in Maryland–Does
a Memorial to Fallen Soldiers Breach the Church-State Wall?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/democracy-in-america/2018/03/06/does-a-memorial-to-fallensoldiers-breach-the-church-state-wall (“Drivers . . . might be forgiven for wondering if Christianity
is the official religion of Bladensburg. At a busy intersection in the town (population 9,148) stands
a chunky 40-foot concrete cross. . . . The words ‘valour’, ‘devotion’ and ‘courage’ are inscribed on
the sides of the cross, but they are not easily visible from the road. There is no church in sight.”)
271. See supra notes 45, 48–50 and accompanying text.
272. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2105–06 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“In cases challenging the government’s display of a religious symbol, the Court has
tested fidelity to the principle of neutrality by asking whether the display has the effect of endorsing
religion. . . . As I see it, when a cross is displayed on public property, the government may be
presumed to endorse its religious content.” (citation omitted)).
273. Id.
274. Id. at 2106–07.
275. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text.
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Allegheny, the Court addressed whether the county’s display of a crèche and
a menorah communicated endorsement of Christianity and Judaism. 276 In
Capitol Square v. Pinette, the Court determined whether a private group’s
display of a cross on state grounds communicated the state’s endorsement of
Christianity. 277 In Van Orden and McCreary, the Court analyzed whether
Ten Commandments displays on state capitol grounds and in a county
courthouse, respectively, communicated endorsement of Christianity. 278
These cases further demonstrate that the potential Establishment Clause
violation inherent in governmental religious displays—including the Cross—
is communication of the government’s endorsement of religion.
3. Justice O’Connor’s Endorsement Test Would Uphold the Cross
Under the endorsement test, as an alteration of the Lemon test, the issue
of governmental purpose in acquiring and maintaining the Cross and the land
on which it stands would be quickly disposed. According to Justice
O’Connor in Lynch, the proper inquiry for this prong is “whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of
religion.” 279 Just as Justice O’Connor easily found that the city in Lynch
included the crèche in its display only as part of an effort to celebrate a public
holiday and did not intend to promote religion, 280 the Court could conclude
that the Commission’s intention in acquiring and maintaining the Cross was
not solely or predominately to promote religion or Christianity. The
government acquired the property out of its concerns for maintaining traffic
safety. 281 And unlike cases like McCreary, where the Court found an
impermissible purpose based on a record of the government’s unadulterated
effort to promote Christian doctrine, 282 in American Legion, evidence of a
predominant secular purpose—commemoration of WWI veterans—appears
276. See supra notes 124–132 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 144–167 and accompanying text.
279. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This is consistent
with the guidance on the purpose prong provided in McCreary, explaining that action passes the
“purpose” inquiry of the Lemon test when it has a secular purpose that is “genuine, not a sham, and
not merely secondary to a religious objective.” McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (explaining the Establishment
Clause “preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or
a particular religious belief is favored or preferred”).
280. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691.
281. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2078 (2019).
282. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 851. For instance, the Ten Commandments display in one of the
companion cases was originally posted in isolation, unaccompanied by any secular writings or
displays, and hung in a ceremony presided over by a Judge-Executive “who recounted the story of
an astronaut who became convinced ‘there must be a divine God’ after viewing the Earth from the
moon.” Id. “The Judge-Executive was accompanied by the pastor of his church, who called the
Commandments ‘a creed of ethics’ . . . .’” Id.
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as early as the very idea to erect the Cross.283 Furthermore, even the Fourth
Circuit—the only court to hold the Cross unconstitutional—found the
government’s purpose was secular and therefore permissible.284
The government’s ownership and maintenance of the Cross would also
pass the effect prong of the endorsement test when analyzed through the eyes
of Justice O’Connor’s “reasonable observer.” The all-knowing reasonable
observer of the Cross would know the monument was originally paid for and
erected by private citizens and a private organization seeking to
commemorate fallen WWI soldiers. 285 The observer would know that the
fundraising and celebration of the Cross by those citizens was in fact often
accompanied by religious expression. 286 But the observer would be just as
aware that the Commission acquired the property and the Cross several
decades later, due to its concerns for traffic safety. Although the observer
cannot be blinded to the physical prominence of the Cross, he or she, in light
of the evidence, would likely not interpret the government’s purpose in
acquiring the land and maintaining the display to be the promotion of
Christianity at the exclusion of other religions. 287 On the ground that the
government has a secular purpose and the all-knowing reasonable observer
would not perceive governmental endorsement of religion, or Christianity to
the exclusion of other religions, the Cross would not be held to violate the
Establishment Clause.
The difference between the dissent’s position and the finding of
constitutionality that would result under the endorsement test is the
consideration of the “reasonable observer”—a concept entirely absent from
the dissenting opinion. The reasonable observer would have considered the
secular meaning taken on by the cross (despite its Christian origins and

283. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
284. Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park, 874 F.3d 195, 206 (4th Cir. 2017), rev’d,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
285. This presumed knowledge follows from Justice O’Connor’s description of the reasonable
observer as “deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears,” Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), and “familiar with ‘implementation of’[the] government action,” McCreary Cty. v.
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
286. See supra notes 10, 12, 18–19, and accompanying text.
287. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 721 (2010) (“The District Court did not attempt to
reassess the findings . . . in light of the policy of accommodation that Congress had embraced. . . .
[A] Latin cross is not merely a reaffirmation of Christian beliefs. . . . Here, one Latin cross in the
desert evokes far more than religion. It evokes thousands of small crosses in foreign fields marking
the graves of Americans who fell in battles, battles whose tragedies are compounded if the fallen
are forgotten.”); Jacobs, supra note 243, at 72 (providing support for the proposition that, assuming
traffic safety is a “central function” of local government, individuals who know the Commission
acquired the Cross and its property due to traffic safety concerns will understand its action does not
to constitute an endorsement of religion).
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retained Christian association), as well as the government’s secular purpose
for acquiring the Cross and the accompanying land. 288 Meanwhile, the
dissent did not evaluate the viewpoint of any particular observer. 289 Instead,
it applied a presumption that religious symbols on government property
convey government endorsement. 290 The result under the endorsement test,
therefore, is controlled by the observer viewpoint (if any) assumed by the
Court.
D. The Court Should Apply a Modified Endorsement Test to Future
Religious Display Challenges
As expressed above, given that the issue at the heart of challenges to
governmental religious displays is the implication of governmental
endorsement, and the endorsement test’s focus on that issue, the test provides
the best means of analysis for such cases. 291 However, this Note proposes
that the endorsement test would better serve a key Establishment Clause
purpose if the viewpoint assumed was changed from that of the all-knowing
observer to an ordinary or typical observer, who knows only what persons
most commonly observing the monument know.
1.

The Court Should Impute the Perspective of an Ordinary
Observer to the Reasonable Observer

The “reasonable observer” standard as it currently stands contains two
major shortcomings. First, the standard is flawed substantively, because its
failure to reflect the perspectives of actual observers disserves the antipolitical division goal of the Establishment Clause. 292 Second, the standard
is practically flawed, since it fails to provide guidance for what the observer
should know. 293
Adopting the perspective of a person that knows all relevant facts
surrounding the history and context of a display simply does not reflect the
reality of most observers. 294 In fact, Justices on both sides of the Court have
288. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 780 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining the reasonable
observer is “deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears”).
289. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2105 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
290. Id.
291. See supra Sections IV.C.1–C.2.
292. See infra notes 302–303 and accompanying text.
293. See infra note 303 and accompanying text.
294. See S.M., supra note 270 (“Yet the judges on both sides of this dispute focus their analysis
on imaginary people—purportedly objective reasonable observers—who neither live in the town
nor pass by the monument.”); Mark Strasser, The Endorsement Test Is Alive and Well: A Cause for
Celebration and Sorrow, 39 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1273, 1283 (2013) (describing the result of Justice
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taken issue with the concept of the “reasonable observer” due to its
inapplicability to the real members of a display’s audience. 295 Justice
Thomas described the observer as “unusually informed,” and criticized the
perspective as “not fully satisfying to . . . nonadherents or adherents” of the
demonstrated religion. 296 Justice Scalia challenged the idea of attributing allknowing views to the reasonable observer in his McCreary dissent, arguing
the county’s Ten Commandments displays should have been upheld because
a reasonable observer would not have known the backstory unveiling the
government’s true purpose of promoting religion. 297 Justice Stevens also
criticized the omniscient viewpoint in his Capitol Square dissent, where he
argued a reasonable observer would perceive government endorsement of
religion based on the presence of a religious symbol on its property. 298 He
relegated Justice O’Connor’s all-knowing reasonable observer to a “legal
fiction,” 299 writing:
The ideal human Justice O’Connor describes knows and
understands much more than meets the eye. Her “reasonable
person” comes off as a well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the
tort-law model. . . . [This standard] strips of constitutional
protection every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to
fall below some “ideal” standard. 300
This all-knowing observer standard is problematic, because accounting
for the impressions of only the most informed members of a community
undercuts one of the purposes of the Religion Clauses: preventing political
divisiveness based on religion. 301 Professor Richard Garnett has pointed out
that the very concern Justice O’Connor purported to address with the
endorsement test—casting nonadherents as outsiders in the political
community—“seems consonant with, if not equivalent to, asking whether
O’Connor’s endorsement test in Lynch as “problematic, because such a position is utterly divorced
from actual perceptions”).
295. See infra notes 296–300 and accompanying text.
296. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
297. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 911 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[I]t is unlikely that a reasonable observer would even have been aware of the
resolutions, so there would be nothing to ‘cast off.’”).
298. Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 801–02 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 800 n.5.
300. Id.
301. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining the Religion Clauses
“seek to avoid that divisiveness based upon religion that promotes social conflict, sapping the
strength of government and religion alike” (citing Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717–
29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting))); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (“Ordinarily
political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy
manifestations of our democratic system of government, but political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.” (citing
Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969))).
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that same state action does or could cause political divisiveness.” 302 And yet
as Professor Mark Strasser explained, Justice O’Connor’s test “seems much
more concerned about the feelings of the hypothetical observer and much less
concerned that some members of the community might reasonably and
actually feel like insiders and outsiders respectively because of a particular
display.” 303 Divisiveness between persons and institutions of different
religious beliefs and between religious and non-religious persons and
institutions may still result if persons possessing the more “standard” level of
knowledge regarding a display do not perceive government endorsement of
religion.
A secondary, practical flaw of this reasonable observer standard is that
it fails to provide any firm guidance on the type of person in the community
whose perspective it reflects. 304 In the absence of clear guidance, the Court
is left to its own subjective devices to determine what a “reasonable” person
would know. 305 The Court is thus confined to the fiction that “reasonable”
persons could not possibly disagree on whether a display communicates
government endorsement of religion. 306 Therefore, the prevailing view of the
302. Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1700
(2006).
303. Strasser, supra note 294, at 1293.
304. See Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 768, n.3 (“[I]f further proof of the invited chaos is required,
one need only follow the debate between the concurrence [written by Justice O’Connor] and Justice
Stevens’ dissent as to whether the hypothetical beholder who will be the determinant of
‘endorsement’ should be any beholder (no matter how unknowledgeable), or the average beholder,
or (what Justice Stevens accuses the concurrence of favoring) the ‘ultrareasonable’ beholder.”);
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 137, 234 (1989) (“[T]he endorsement test, as the Court presents
it [in Allegheny], suffers from three basic flaws: (1) uncertainty as to who is the relevant person to
judge the effect of the governmental act . . . .”); Strasser, supra note 294, at 1289 (“[M]embers of
the Court have had some difficulty in specifying just what or how much the reasonable observer
should know before making a judgment about whether something promotes or undermines
religion.”).
305. See Leading Cases, supra note 304, at 235 (“Without any stated constraints, it is most
likely that ‘a person will assume the objective observer to be him or herself rather than employ an
external standard.’ Thus, because the standard does not depend upon the perception of real human
beings, and the inquiry is undertaken devoid of any explicitly stated perspective, . . . it seems
inevitable that results will depend largely on the personal perceptions of the individual Justices.”
(footnote omitted)); Wexler, supra note 258, at 265 (“[T]he test favors majority religious traditions
over minority ones, because the judges who must decide whether a symbol or display sends a
forbidden message are themselves generally adherents of a majority tradition.”); Richard Wolf,
Does a 40-foot Latin Cross Honoring World War I Veterans Violate the Constitution? The Supreme
Court
Will
Decide.,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
20,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/20/cross-shaped-war-monument-putssupreme-court-crosshairs/2792388002/ (explaining in 2010, while serving on a federal appeals
court, future Justice Gorsuch ruled the reasonable observer was “biased, replete with foibles and
prone to mistake”).
306. Strasser, supra note 294, at 1300–01 (“Rather than decide whether Establishment Clause
guarantees are violated or instead respected when some reasonable observers would infer
endorsement and others would not, members of the Court instead pretend that reasonable observers

2020]

AMERICAN LEGION V. AMERICAN HUMANIST ASS’N

873

“reasonable observer” will likely be whatever scope of knowledge resonates
with the majority of Justices. 307 This ascribes no ill will to the members of
the Court, but recognizes that such an approach would only be human nature.
In fact, in applying such a standard, spectators succumb to the same tendency
to use their own subjective views to determine what a “reasonable” person
would believe. 308
In light of these shortcomings, the Court should adopt a new definition
of the “reasonable observer” that assumes the viewpoint of an ordinary
observer of the display. This modified definition of a reasonable observer
finds support in the “reasonable man” standard at the center of negligence in
tort law. 309 Just as the “reasonable man” in tort would possess the
“intelligence, knowledge, and experience” of an ordinary person in like
circumstances, 310 the reasonable observer of a religious display should
possess the same level of contextual knowledge as most (i.e., ordinary)
persons who come into contact with the display. This idea is arguably the
natural consequence of the Court’s logic in McCreary, where, although not
purporting to alter Justice O’Connor’s reasonable observer standard, it stated
“reasonable observers have reasonable memories.” 311 The Court argued that
an observer would not be able to ignore the government’s initial, but still
recent, religion-oriented actions and purposes in posting the Ten
Commandments displays. 312 Although the effect of that reasoning was still
to assume the viewpoint of an observer aware of the complete history of the
displays, the Court’s expression of “reasonable memories” begs the question
whether it would have attributed that same omniscience to the reasonable
observer had those initial government actions taken place ninety years prior.
The ordinary observer’s scope of knowledge would not be fixed across
all cases. This distinguishes the proposed approach from Justice O’Connor’s
test, where the observer knows all relevant context, 313 and from Justice

could not disagree. Such an approach is especially disappointing, given the numerous cases in
which presumably reasonable members of the Court could not themselves agree about whether a
particular practice constitutes state endorsement.”).
307. Id.
308. See, e.g., Kelly Shackelford, Ruling Threatens Md. ‘Peace Cross’ and Other Veterans
Memorials, BALT. SUN, (Jan. 2, 2019), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinion/op-ed/bs-ed-op0103-peace-cross-20190102-story.html (“There is no reasonableness in an observer who would
have hurt feelings over the simple presence of a cross-shaped veterans memorial on public
property.”)
309. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“Unless the actor is a
child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a
reasonable man under like circumstances.”).
310. Id. § 283, cmt. d.
311. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005).
312. Id.
313. Capitol Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Ginsburg’s approach, where observers are presumed to know nothing that
would mitigate an implication of government endorsement. 314 Just as in tort
law, the reasonable observer’s knowledge depends on the facts in each
case. 315 For instance, the Court’s assessment of what the reasonable observer
knows would consider where the monument is located: Is it in a secluded
park, meaning only persons intending to closely observe the monument and
learn of its history will see it? In that case, a person visiting the park will be
the reasonable observer. Or is the display in unobstructed view in a heavily
frequented area, such as on the side of a major highway, so that persons not
seeking out the monument will see it anyway? The reasonable observer in
that instance might be a person driving by on the highway who possesses no
background knowledge of the display. Depending on the type of highway,
the reasonable observer may be from out of town, which would further limit
their presumed knowledge. The Court would also consider how readily
available any mitigating information is to reasonable observers. Is there a
visible sign accompanying the monument that makes apparent a secular
purpose or meaning, or that makes clear the monument was originally erected
by private persons rather than the government? Or is there no information
present when viewing the monument from that observer’s physical position?
Such inquiries would provide a more practical approach that considers the
perspectives of the persons most likely to be affected by the display’s
presence.
This line of inquiry would also give way to more concrete means for
parties to support their arguments in court. Proponents of a display could
provide evidence of any information readily available to the public that
shows the display is not part of a governmental effort to endorse religion and
present proof of the extent to which reasonable observers are aware of such
mitigating history and context. 316 Opponents may point to the lack of such

314. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2105 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
315. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283, cmt. d (“The qualities of a reasonable man
which are of importance differ with the various situations in which the phrase is used. . . . [T]he
qualities . . . are those which are necessary for the perception of the circumstances existing at the
time of his act or omission and such intelligence, knowledge, and experience as are necessary to
enable him to recognize the chance of harm to others involved therein.”).
316. For general support of the idea that information about the origins of a governmental
religious display, when accessible, may reasonably impact observers’ perceptions of whether the
government endorses religion, see Alan Garfield, Opinion: Does a Cross Memorializing Soldiers
Violate the Separation of Church and State?, DEL. ONLINE (Feb. 20, 2019),
https://www.delawareonline.com/story/opinion/contributors/2019/02/20/opinion-cross-publicproperty-unconstitutional/2927129002/. “Like Breyer in the Texas case, I’m willing to give the
100-year-old Peace Cross a pass (although there should be a more visible marker to clarify that it is
a war memorial).” Id.; see also Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 769 (“If Ohio is concerned about
misperceptions [about government endorsement of religion], nothing prevents it from requiring all
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information and show proof that the observer population is largely unaware
of any secular history and context. 317 If it turns out the type of person most
often and ordinarily coming into contact with the display would not be aware
of enough “mitigating” information to conclude that the government is not
seeking to endorse religion, then the display must be held invalid.318 And of
course, if no mitigating history or context exists, the display would more
readily be deemed invalid.
The remedies for certain displays that fail this test could also be less
drastic than those that fail under the Lemon test. In the case of longstanding
religious displays that have mitigating secular histories and purposes
unknown to the reasonable observer, the Court might order a remedy that
does not require tearing down the display but making those mitigating aspects
more readily apparent. 319 For instance, the Court might require a large sign
to accompany the monument, explaining its origins and the government’s
purpose for maintaining it. 320 This idea was proffered by Justice O’Connor
herself in Capitol Square, as a way to “remove doubt about state approval of
respondents’ religious message” in the case of the unattended cross standing
near to government buildings. 321 Of course, this may only be practical for
displays where observers have time to safely read the sign, making such a
remedy imperfect for a display on a highway where the history requires a
lengthy explanation. Nonetheless, the burden of coming up with a safe,
practical and effective remedy can fall on the parties.
None of this is to say that even a modified reasonable observer standard
would be without flaws. The task of determining what a reasonable person
would know has some fuzziness, just as identifying the theoretical behavior
private displays in the Square to be identified as such. That would be a content-neutral ‘manner’
restriction that is assuredly constitutional.”)
317. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 769.
318. See id. at 776–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I disagree [with the plurality] that ‘[i]t has
radical implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid whenever
hypothetical observers may—even reasonably—confuse an incidental benefit to religion with state
endorsement.’ On the contrary, when the reasonable observer would view a government practice
as endorsing religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid.” (citation omitted)).
319. See Jacobs, supra note 243, at 57–58. Jacobs argues that in the case of public forums,
funds, or projects made available or accessible to private persons or entities, it is permissible for
such resources to go a religious entity “so long as the criteria for selection are apparent and purely
secular.” Id. Transparency matters because “although imputing meaning is in some ways
subjective, to the extent that we can identify common interpretive patterns, we can more precisely
define what the action reasonably communicates.” Id.
320. See supra note 316.
321. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 776 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would add the presence of
a sign disclaiming government sponsorship or endorsement on the Klan cross, which would make
the State’s role clear to the community. This factor is important because . . . certain aspects of the
cross display in this case arguably intimate government approval of respondents’ private religious
message, particularly that the cross is an especially potent sectarian symbol which stood unattended
in close proximity to official government buildings.”).
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of the reasonable man in tort law. 322 And methodologies that require the
Court to assume the viewpoints of community members have been criticized
for perpetuating “majoritarian norms and neglect[ing] the real needs of
religious minorities.” 323 Despite the admitted force of these criticisms, an
endorsement test that does not attempt to consider any viewpoint cannot
possibly address the very concern that a government action, although perhaps
not actually advancing religion, has the effect of communicating
endorsement. A test not attempting to emulate any person’s viewpoint
would, by definition, measure objective effect only. And consensus that
religion has been objectively “established” would likely only be reached for
the bluntest of government actions, such as the naming an official religion,
or the institution of prayer practice in public schools—scenarios which have
already been deemed unconstitutional.324 Anything less egregious would be
difficult to strike down as an objective establishment of religion, since, as
Justice O’Connor has acknowledged, “[r]easonable minds can disagree about
how to apply the Religion Clauses in a given case.” 325
Alternatively, a test purporting not to adopt a particular viewpoint would
employ a presumption for or against endorsement. But any means of
overcoming the presumption would still necessarily assess a viewpoint, as
evidenced by Justice Ginsburg’s suggestion for overcoming a presumption
of endorsement: Considering whether the setting of a display is free of signs
of government endorsement nonetheless must assume someone’s point of
view. 326 Essentially, an endorsement test worthy of its name will require an
attempt to emulate some observer’s viewpoint.

322. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“[T]his
standard of the reasonable man . . . enables the triers of fact . . . to look to a community standard
rather than an individual one, and at the same time to express their judgment of what that standard
is in terms of the conduct of a human being. The standard provides sufficient flexibility, and leeway,
to permit due allowance to be made for such differences between individuals as the law permits to
be taken into account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the case which may reasonably
affect the conduct required. . . .”).
323. Jacobs, supra note 243, at 76–77.
324. See supra notes 79–84.
325. McCreary Cty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor,
J., concurring). Justice O’Connor disagreed, however, with the notion that this truth should be
control Establishment Clause analysis. Id. She followed this statement by saying, “But the goal of
the Clauses is clear: to carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest
extent possible in a pluralistic society.” Id.
326. See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2106–07 (2019) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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2. Applying the Modified Reasonable Observer Standard Would Deem
the Cross a Violation of the Establishment Clause
The proposed reasonable observer standard would have led to holding
the Cross unconstitutional. This is because the modified reasonable
observer’s level of knowledge will vary given objective factors of the display,
and such observers of the Cross would not know all the relevant details of its
history.
The type of person most commonly coming into contact with the Cross
is almost certainly a driver on an adjacent highway, rather than a pedestrian
setting out to visit the monument. This is likely given the Cross’s location at
the busy intersection of Baltimore Avenue and Bladensburg Road, 327 with
Bladensburg Road providing a direct six mile route to Washington, D.C. 328
Not only is the Cross observed daily by an abundance of drivers, but it is not
readily accessible to pedestrians. Because the Cross is surrounded on all
sides by highway, there is no convenient (and arguably, safe) parking. 329
Persons who wish to view the monument up close must park elsewhere and
cross traffic by foot. 330
Many of those persons who drive by the Cross likely know or assume it
stands on government property since it is in the median of a busy highway. 331
But those persons probably do not know of the Cross’s history and those
details that evince a more secular purpose: that the Cross was erected by
private citizens and the American Legion, and only taken over by the
government years later out of its concern for traffic safety. 332 If most people
coming into contact with the Cross are not aware of that history, they likely
assume the government has erected and maintains the monument, and
327. GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (type in the field in the upper left hand
corner “Peace Cross”; then click on the “+” icon in the bottom right corner of the page to zoom in
until road names are visible) (last visited Mar. 28, 2020).
328. GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (click on the arrow icon in the upper left
hand corner for “directions”; then type in the top field for origin “Peace Cross” and “Washington,
D.C.” in the bottom field for destination) (last visited Mar. 28, 2020).
329. GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps (type in the field in the upper left hand
corner “Peace Cross”; then click on the square at the bottom left corner of the page that says
“satellite”; this provides a bird’s eye view of the monument and closely surrounding roads) (last
visited Mar. 28, 2020).
330. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct.
2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717) (“There are no walkways, by the way, to the cross. You have to risk
life and limb to get over the—the lanes of traffic.”).
331. See S.M., supra note 270; Garfield, supra note 316.
332. See Garfield, supra note 316 (“If we stop to explore the island, you’ll realize that the cross
is a war memorial . . . . But if we cruise past the monument, as most people do, your only takeaway
is of a giant cross on a public highway median.”); S.M., supra note 270 (“[V]ery few of the
thousands of drivers passing through the area will have a clue that the gargantuan cross
commemorates fallen soldiers at all, or that it has been adorning Bladensburg byways for nearly a
century. For them, the cross may well appear to poke a hole in America’s church-state wall.”).

878

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:836

therefore approves of its religious message. 333 Drivers would also notice the
Cross is at least four times as tall as the other monuments in the park, the
nearest of which is 200 hundred feet away. 334 Those observers may interpret
the monument’s prominence as an indication of the government’s support for
Christianity, and perhaps even an intent to encourage support for Christianity
in the community. 335 Thus, the Cross would violate the Establishment
Clause.
The remedy for this violation would not require tearing down or altering
the structure of the Cross itself. Because the perspective of this modified
reasonable observer hinged on the uninformed interpretations of persons
driving by the Cross, the remedy could instead focus on supplying the lack
of common, public knowledge regarding the secular aspects of the Cross’s
origins and purpose. 336 The Commission could have been ordered to erect a
large sign accompanying the Cross, noting it was erected by private citizens
and the American Legion in 1925 as a WWI memorial. 337
V. CONCLUSION
In American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, the Supreme Court
held that longstanding religious monuments on government property are
presumptively constitutional and not subject to formal Establishment Clause
scrutiny. 338 In doing so, the Court formalized what was a rarely used, albeit
tacit constitutional exemption for the government’s longstanding religious

333. See Harry Litman, Why the Peace Cross Case Is So Important, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/01/why-peace-cross-case-is-so-important/
(noting that upon driving by the Cross, “[u]ninformed passersby might conclude that they have
driven into a very pious Christian community”); Ian Millhiser, The Religious Right Is Getting
Played by the Supreme Court, THINK PROGRESS (June 20, 2019), https://thinkprogress.org/peacecross-religious-right-supreme-court-fbd678e96079/ (countering Justice Alito’s argument that Bayer
and other corporations’ use of the cross as a logo evidences its secularity, saying, “If you were
driving down the street and saw the image at the top of this column [a picture of the Cross], would
you believe you were looking at a symbol of Christianity or a symbol of aspirin?”); see also Capitol
Square v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 801–02 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The ‘reasonable observer’
of any symbol placed unattended in front of any capital in the world will normally assume that the
sovereign which is not only the owner of the parcel of real estate but also the lawgiver for the
surrounding territory has sponsored and facilitated its message.”).
334. See supra notes 15, 21 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 332.
336. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 320–321 and accompanying text.
338. See supra Section III.
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practices, 339 all while undermining but not overruling the Lemon test. 340 The
Court missed an opportunity to formally adopt and modify its most
appropriate test, the endorsement test, for analyzing religious display
challenges. 341
Under the proposed modified endorsement test, the Court would have
first determined that drivers on the adjacent highways are the persons who
most often come into contact with the Cross, rather than pedestrians intending
to visit and learn about its history. 342 The Court then would have held the
Cross unconstitutional upon finding that those drivers, being uninformed
about the Cross’s origins and the government’s secular purpose in
maintaining it, would perceive the Cross as a governmental endorsement of
religion. 343 An appropriate remedy would not have required demolition of
the Cross, but a means of making the mitigating, secular aspects of Cross
readily apparent to its most common observers. 344
Nevertheless, this case signals the conservative Court’s departure from
the longstanding neutrality principle embedded in Lemon and a shift towards
tolerance of government acknowledgement of time-honored religious
practices.

339. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In effect, the
Court holds that officially sponsored legislative prayer, primarily on account of its ‘unique
history,’ . . . is generally exempted from the First Amendment’s prohibition against ‘an
establishment of religion.’”).
340. See supra Section IV.B.
341. See supra Section IV.C.
342. See supra Section IV.C.2.
343. See supra Section IV.C.2.
344. See supra Section IV.C.2.

